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Abstract
According to New Institutional Economics, two or more individuals will
found an organization, if it leads to a benefit compared to market allocation.
A natural consequence will then be internal rent seeking. We discuss the in-
terrelation between profits, rent seeking and the foundation of organizations.
Typically, we expect that highly profitable firms are always founded but it
is not clear whether the same is true for firms with less optimistic prospects.
We will show that internal rent seeking may lead to a completely reversed
result. The impact of internal rent seeking on overall investment and the
implications of firm size and competition on the foundation of organizations
are also addressed.
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1 Introduction
Following the main idea of New Institutional Economics, market frictions
(like transaction costs) or market failures are a necessary condition for the
emergence of institutions and organizations (Arrow 1969, 1985; Furubotn
and Richter 2005). In such situations, two or more individuals will found
an organization if it generates a benefit compared to pure market allocation.
This benefit can be referred to as the organization’s rent.1 However, if in-
ternal relations are (at least partly) covered by incomplete contracts, there
will be a struggle among the organization members when distributing the
rent. This struggle can be characterized as influence activities (e.g. Milgrom
1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1988) or internal rent seeking (e.g. Müller and
Wärneryd 2001; Inderst, Müller and Wärneryd 2005, 2006).
In this paper, we will show that such struggle may lead to a situation
in which highly profitable firms are not founded due to excessive rent seek-
ing. In contrast, less profitable firms are founded since organization members
have only low incentives for struggling. This "adverse selection" of firms is
only possible if the organization’s rent or profits are exogenously determined
by given production technology once the individuals have decided to found
the organization. If profits are endogenously realized by the individuals’ in-
vestments, this problem will never happen as the organization members will
always adjust their investments downwards when anticipating rent seeking.
1For example, this rent can be due to saved transaction costs, secured specific invest-
ments because of vertical integration, or secured cooperation rents because of internal
solutions of prisoner’s-dilemma like situations.
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On the one hand, this adjustment guarantees that each organization mem-
ber’s utility strictly increases in the organization’s profits. On the other
hand, from a welfare perspective, adjustments may lead to more underin-
vestment in highly profitable organizations compared to less profitable ones.
Moreover, the impact of firm size and competition on the foundation deci-
sion is discussed. The findings show that increasing firm size may or may
not work against the "adverse selection" result depending on the interplay of
two effects: Increasing the number of organization members implies a lower
share in the organization’s profits for each individual which makes founda-
tion less attractive. However, enlarging the number of organization members
discourages internal rent seeking which favors foundation. Finally, it can be
shown that under competition a positive profit shock does not alter an orga-
nization member’s individual utility. Hence, political interventions implying
such positive shock in order to stimulate the foundation of organizations are
ineffectual.
The paper is related to the work on internal rent seeking which starts with
the assumption that internal relations are only covered by incomplete con-
tracts which leave room for internal struggling. As one of the first authors,
Masten (1986) builds on the rent seeking model by Tullock (1980) in order
to discuss internal competition for rents. The relation of incomplete con-
tracts and rent seeking is also directly addressed by Skaperdas (1992) and
Konrad (2002). Other authors combine contest models with organization
theory. Ellingsen (1997) considers a situation in which agents choose both
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productive and rent seeking efforts. He shows that in the given setting it is
not optimal for the principal to eliminate rent seeking completely. Müller
and Wärneryd (2001) point to the advantages of outside ownership in the
presence of internal rent seeking to explain the coexistence of partnerships
and stock corporations. Konrad (2004) shows that organizing distributional
conflicts within a hierarchy may imply lower overall rent seeking expendi-
tures. Inderst, Müller and Wärneryd (2005) emphasize that a large number
of hierarchy levels may be beneficial for limiting overall rent seeking. Inderst,
Müller and Wärneryd (2006) stress the benefits of a multi-divisional firm for
reducing internal rent-seeking which can explain the replacement of the U-
form with the M-form during the twentieth century. Kräkel (2006) analyzes
the impact of firm size and the economic situation on the intensity of internal
rent seeking. Gibbons (2005) even sketches an elemental rent seeking theory
of the firm.
In the following section, the basic model is introduced. Section 3 deals
with the case of exogenously given profits whereas Section 4 focuses on en-
dogenous profits. Section 5 offers a discussion of the previous results by
considering the impact of firm size and competition. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Basic Model
We consider a simple two-stage game between n homogeneous individuals
with reservation value zero.2 At the first stage, the n players have to decide
on the foundation of an organization. Foundation requires capital expen-
diture κ > 0 of each individual. Let n be exogenously given (e.g. due to
required human capital or limited wealth). If all n players approve founda-
tion, then the organization will realize profits π > 0; otherwise the game ends
since the organization is not founded, and each individual gets zero reserva-
tion value. If the organization has been founded, the n organization members
struggle for the distribution of π at stage 2. Here, each player i (i = 1, . . . , n)
can exert effort ei in order to increase his share si in π. We assume a sym-
metric sharing function si = s (ei; e−i) with e−i = (e1, . . . , ei−1, ei+1, . . . , en)
(i = 1, . . . , n) and ∂s
∂ei
> 0, ∂
2s
∂e2i
≤ 0 which is independent of a permutation
of subscripts. Hence, the sharing function is characterized by positive but
decreasing marginal returns and by symmetry among the organization mem-
bers due to assumed homogeneity. Furthermore, let si ≤ 1 (i = 1, . . . , n) and
nP
i=1
si = 1. We assume that effort ei entails costs on individual i, denoted by
the convex function c (ei) with c0 (·) , c00 (·) > 0 and c (0) = c0 (0) = 0.
2When profits are endogenous we will have a further stage.
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3 Exogenous profits
First, let profits π be exogenously given. At stage 2, each organization mem-
ber solves
max
ei
π · s (ei; e−i)− c (ei)
(expenditure κ is sunk) which leads to an interior symmetric solution e∗ =
H (π) withH (·) = h−1 (·) and h (ei) = c0(ei)∂s/∂ei for each member i withH 0 (·) >
0. At stage 1, the n players have to decide on foundation of the organization.
Note that si = s (e∗, . . . , e∗) is identical for each player so that, in case of
foundation, each player’s utility can be written as
ui =
π
n
− c (H (π))− κ. (1)
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 There exist feasible functions s (ei; e−i) and c (ei), profits
π2 > π1 and parameter values of κ so that an organization with profits
π1 is founded but not an organization with profits π2. In particular, if
c0 (H (π))H 0 (π) is monotonically increasing in π, there will exist three cut-
off values πˇ, π˜ and πˆ with πˇ < π˜ < πˆ so that an organization will be founded
if and only if π ∈ (πˇ, πˆ); organization members suffer from increasing profits
as long as π ∈ (π˜, πˆ).
Proof. Let c0 (H (π))H 0 (π) be monotonically increasing. Differentiating
(1) with respect to π yields 1
n
− c0 (H (π))H 0 (π) which is positive for π = 0
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and monotonically decreasing in π. Define πˇ, π˜ and πˆ as πˇ
n
= c (H (πˇ)) + κ,
1
n
= c0 (H (π˜))H 0 (π˜) with π˜
n
− c (H (π˜))−κ > 0, and πˆ
n
= c (H (πˆ))+κ, with
πˇ < πˆ, which proves the second part of the proposition.
In order to prove the first part, we show that the second part holds for
a specific cost and a specific sharing function which satisfy the assumptions
of Section 2. Let n = 2 and c (ei) = c2e
2
i with c > 0 (i = 1, 2). Furthermore,
let s (ei; e−i) be a probit-form contest success function (Dixit 1987, 893).
More specifically, let i’s share si = s (ei; e−i) be determined by relative effort
ei−ej and exogenous luck ε following a uniform distribution over the interval
[−ε¯, ε¯] so that si =prob{ε < ei − ej} = ei−ej+ε¯2ε¯ .3 This specification yields
π · s (ei; e−i) − c (ei) = π ei−ej+ε¯2ε¯ − c2e2i and, therefore, optimal effort choices
e∗ = H (π) = π
2cε¯
which results into strict concave utility ui = π2 −
π2
8cε¯2
− κ
for the first stage with c0 (H (π))H 0 (π) = π
4cε¯2
.
The proposition shows that not always the most profitable organizations
will be founded. On the contrary, it is possible that, given two alternative
technologies, the organization with the less profitable technology is founded
but individuals do not approve foundation of the organization with the more
profitable technology because of escalating internal rent seeking at the second
stage of the game. We can differentiate between four intervals. Very low
3More generally, we can assume that i’s rent seeking performance is described by qi =
ei + εi and that of j by qj = ej + εj with εi and εj being i.i.d.. If now i’s share is
determined by relative performance qi−qj so that si = G (ei − ej) with G (·) denoting the
cdf of εj − εi we will obtain a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium e∗ = πg (0) /c which
yields utility ui = π2 −
π2[g(0)]2
2c − κ being strictly concave in π. However, note that G (·)
is not necessarily concave. Hence, we have to assume a sufficiently high impact of relative
noise εj − εi for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
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profits π ∈ [0, πˇ] cannot compensate an individual for his initial investment κ
and anticipated rent seeking costs so that the organization is not founded. For
low profits π ∈ (πˇ, π˜), the organization is founded and organization members
benefit from a marginal increase in profits since the utility increasing profit
effect dominates internal rent seeking. For intermediate values of π (i.e.
π ∈ (π˜, πˆ)), the players still agree to found an organization but they suffer
from a marginal increase in π, because the rent seeking effect dominates the
profit effect. For large values of π with π ≥ πˆ excessive internal rent seeking
prevents foundation of the organization.
To sum up, if an organization’s profits are mainly determined by exoge-
nously given technology, it is not true that, from an evolutionary perspective,
only the most profitable organizations will emerge whereas less profitable or-
ganizations will not be founded. On the contrary, if internal relations are
mainly covered by incomplete contracts which leave scope for internal rent
seeking there may be an "adverse selection" of technologies in the sense of
Proposition 1.
4 Endogenous profits
In this section, we assume that, in stage 1, when founding an organization
each member i can endogenously spend monetary resources µi to increase
gross profits π. Let π = α · y (Pni=1 µi) denote endogenous gross profits
with y0 (·) > 0, y00 (·) ≤ 0 and let α > 0 indicate productivity and, hence,
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profitability of the organization’s applied technology. Now player i’s utility
at stage 1 in case of foundation is given by the concave function
ui (µi) =
αy (
Pn
i=1 µi)
n
− c (H (αy (
Pn
i=1 µi)))− µi − κ. (2)
An interior solution for optimal resource expenditures µi is described by
first-order condition
αy0 (
Pn
i=1 µi)
µ
1
n
− c0 (H (π))H 0 (π)
¶
= 1. (3)
Let µ∗i (α) denote the solution of equation (3). By differentiating ui (µ
∗
i (α))
with respect to α and applying the envelope theorem we obtain
dui
dα
=
∂ui
∂α
= y (
Pn
i=1 µ
∗
i (α))
µ
1
n
− c0 (H (π))H 0 (π)
¶
| {z }
=:Ω
(4)
which is positive since Ω > 0 as we know from (3):
Proposition 2 Let π = αy (
Pn
i=1 µi) describe endogenous profits with α > 0
and µi denoting monetary expenditures chosen by organization member i.
Given an interior solution for expenditures, if an organization with technol-
ogy α¯ is founded, then the same will apply to any other organization with
technology α > α¯.
The findings of Proposition 2 demonstrate that the "adverse selection"
result of Proposition 1 will no longer hold, if profits are determined en-
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dogenously by the organization members’ investments. In this situation,
organizations with highly productive technologies will no longer suffer from
excessive rent seeking. The players anticipate internal rent seeking in stage
2 when choosing expenditures µi at stage 1. Hence, they will always opti-
mally adapt their investment levels µ∗i (α) given a certain technology α so
that productivity gains can be secured.
Of course, organization members will never choose first-best or efficient
investment levels, i.e. investments that maximize welfare4
W = αy
µ
nP
i=1
µi
¶
−
nP
i=1
µi,
as each member only gets the fraction 1/n of realized gross profits when
spending resources µi which results into the well-known free-rider problem.
Let M : =
Pn
i=1 µi denote aggregate investment. Then efficient aggregate
investment is characterized by5
αy0 (M) = 1. (5)
Hence, the higher the productivity parameter α the higher should be ag-
gregate investment M due to the concavity of y (·). This implies that the
organization with the highest α should also have the highest aggregate in-
4Welfare maximization under first-best conditions which allow the use of forcing con-
tracts leads to ei = 0, ∀i.
5Since investment costs are linear, only aggregate investment is unique and we have a
continuum of equilibria at the first stage.
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vestment level. However, as the following result will show this correlation
does not always hold if there is internal rent seeking:
Proposition 3 In the two-stage model with endogenous profits and internal
rent seeking, the organizations with the most productive technologies do not
necessarily have the highest level of aggregate investment.
Proof. Implicit differentiation of (3) yields
∂µ∗i
∂α
=
y0 (M)
©
Ω− αy (M)
¡
c00 (H (π)) [H 0 (π)]2 + c0 (H (π))H 00 (π)
¢ª
−αy00 (M)Ω+ α2 [y0 (M)]2
¡
c00 (H (π)) [H 0 (π)]2 + c0 (H (π))H 00 (π)
¢ ,
with π, Ω and M as being defined above. Note that the denominator is
always positive, but the numerator may be either positive or negative. It
will be negative, if
Ω < αy (M)
³
c00 (H (π)) [H 0 (π)]2 + c0 (H (π))H 00 (π)
´
. (6)
Then individual and, hence, aggregate investment will be decreasing in α.
As an example, we can use the specifications from the proof of Proposition
1 together with the parameterized production function π = α
pPn
i=1 µi (n =
2). At the second stage, player i maximizes
α
p
µi + µj · s (ei; e−i)− c (ei) = α
p
µi + µj
ei − ej + ε¯
2ε¯
− c
2
e2i
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which leads to
e∗ =
α
p
µi + µj
2cε¯
. (7)
At stage 1, each player i decides on his optimal investment level. He maxi-
mizes his strictly concave objective function
ui =
α
p
µi + µj
2
−
α2
¡
µi + µj
¢
8cε¯2
− κ− µi.
The first-order condition leads to optimal aggregate investment µ∗i + µ
∗
j =
M =
³
2αcε¯2
α2+8cε¯2
´2
.
Corollary 1 Let c (ei) = c2e
2
i (c > 0), si =
ei−ej+ε¯
2ε¯
(ε¯ > 0) and π =
α
pPn
i=1 µi (α > 0) with n = 2. We have
∂M
∂α
> (<)0 if α < (>)
√
8cε¯2.
The corollary shows that aggregate investment, M , increases for small
values of the productivity parameter, but decreases for large ones. On the
one hand, enlargement of α makes resource expenditures µi more productive
which leads to higher investment. Note that free riding lessens increased
investment incentives. On the other hand, both higher values of α and more
investment leads to increased rent-seeking (see equation (7)) and, therefore,
rent seeking costs, c (ei). Since c (ei) is a convex function, the last effect will
become dominant if α takes on sufficiently large values. Simple comparative
statics show that the lower the cost parameter c and the risk parameter
ε¯, the more important will be the last effect. Of course if, on the contrary,
both parameters are arbitrarily large, exerting rent seeking effort will be very
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costly and quite ineffective so that overall rent seeking incentives and, hence,
the last effect will diminish.
To sum up, adjusting optimal investment to a given value of the produc-
tivity parameter α while anticipating rent seeking assures that organization
members always gain from higher profits (Proposition 2). However, these
adjustments may lead to more underinvestment at stage 1.6 As Proposition
3 shows, this effect can lead to more productive organizations investing less
than less productive organizations.
5 Discussion
Organizations typically differ in many respects. In particular, organizations
are of different size and are in different competitive environments. In order
to test the robustness of the previous findings, this section considers the
influence of firm size and competition on the possible "adverse selection" of
organizations.
5.1 Firm Size
First, the interrelation between organization or firm size n and the founda-
tion of the organization will be discussed. According to the basic model, each
individual has to spend starting capital κ when founding the organization.
Hence, overall starting capital amounts to nκ = K. There exist good rea-
6Recall that we have already underinvestment due to free riding.
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sons to think about a variation of n. For example, if the founder members
are restricted in wealth so that individuals cannot finance κ, the number of
organization members, n, has to be increased to achieve K. In the following,
the implication of an increase in n will be analyzed.
Let profits π be exogenously given and foundation be efficient in the sense
of π > K. Since equilibrium rent seeking in stage 2 depends on both profits
and firm size, it can be written as
e∗ = H (π, n) .
An organization member’s objective function at stage 1 of the game can now
be described by
ui =
π −K
n
− c (H (π, n)) .
Differentiating ui with respect to n yields the following corollary:7
Corollary 2 Let profits π be exogenously given. An organization member’s
individual utility will increase (decrease) in firm size iff
−c0 (H (π, n)) · ∂H
∂n
> (<)
π −K
n2
. (8)
The term on the right-hand side of (8) is always positive as foundation is
assumed to be efficient. The effect associated with this term can be labeled
sharing effect. If net profits, π − K, have to be shared among a larger
7Although n is a positive integer, for simplicity n is treated as a continuous variable.
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number of individuals, foundation will become less attractive. The algebraic
sign of the left-hand side of (8) may be positive or negative. However, in
most standard rent seeking contests it will be positive due to ∂H/∂n < 0.
Consider, for example, a logit-form contest (see, e.g., Dixit 1987, and the
axiomatization by Skaperdas 1996) with contest success function
si = s (ei; e−i) =
f (ei)
f (ei) +
P
j 6=i f (ej)
(9)
with f (·) as positive increasing and concave function. At the second stage,
player i maximizes
π
f (ei)
f (ei) +
P
j 6=i f (ej)
− c (ei)
which is strictly concave. The first-order condition leads to
π³Pn
j=1 f (ej)
´2 = c0 (ei)f 0 (ei)Pj 6=i f (ej) .
By inspection of the first-order condition of another organization member
k 6= i,
π³Pn
j=1 f (ej)
´2 = c0 (ek)f 0 (ek)Pj 6=k f (ej) ,
we obtain
c0 (ei)
P
j 6=k f (ej)
f 0 (ei)
=
c0 (ek)
P
j 6=i f (ej)
f 0 (ek)
.
Since each side describes the same monotonically increasing function, we have
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a symmetric equilibrium in which each player exerts
e∗ = H
µ
(n− 1)π
n2
¶
with H (·) being the inverse of h (e∗) = c0(e∗)f(e∗)
f 0(e∗) and monotonically increas-
ing. We obtain
∂H
∂n
= −H 0
µ
(n− 1)π
n2
¶
π
n− 2
n2
< 0.
The effect associated with ∂H/∂n < 0 in (8) can be called discouraging effect:
The larger the number of opponents in the rent seeking contest at stage 2, the
lower will be the relative impact of individual effort and, therefore, individ-
ual effort incentives. Contrary to the sharing effect, the discouraging effect
favors the foundation of large organizations because of reduced individual
rent seeking.
To summarize, if the discouraging effect dominates the sharing effect large
organizations are more likely to be founded than small organizations, but if
the sharing effect is dominant the opposite will hold. Note that in any case
of non-foundation we have a kind of adverse result since founding an orga-
nization is always efficient by assumption. Moreover, in case of a dominant
sharing effect we may have the curious outcome that foundation of a small
organization is impossible due to restricted wealth, but foundation of a large
organization is also not possible because an individual’s share in net profits,
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(π −K) /n, is too low for covering individual rent seeking costs, c (H (π, n)).
Finally, we can have a look at the case of endogenous profits as discussed
in Section 4. Let again π = αy (
Pn
i=1 µi) describe endogenous profits with
α > 0 and µi as monetary expenditures chosen by organization member i.
Now consider the case of a symmetric equilibrium, in which each organization
member chooses expenditures µ∗ (n) in stage 1. Furthermore, let us assume
that rent seeking at stage 2 follows the logit-form contest success function as
introduced above (see equation (9)). Player i’s objective function at stage 1
can then be written as
ui =
αy (nµ∗ (n))−K
n
− c
µ
H
µ
(n− 1)
n2
αy (nµ∗ (n))
¶¶
. (10)
If we now vary firm size in the sense of dui/dn, again the envelope theorem
will apply: dui
dn
= ∂ui
∂µ∗µ
∗0 (n) + ∂ui
∂n
= ∂ui
∂n
. Compared to the case of exogenous
profits, the only difference then results from increasing total expenditures,
nµ∗. As we can see from equation (10), this effect would work against both
the sharing effect (since the numerator of the first term increases in nµ∗) and
the discouraging effect (since the argument of theH (·) function in the second
term increases in nµ∗). Altogether, with endogenous profits we would have
the same two effects as in the case of exogenous profits but results would be
less clear because of the additional effect.
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5.2 Competition
Up to now, we have considered a situation in which the organization can
decide in isolation without paying attention to any other organization or
firm which operates in the same product market. In case of a monopoly,
this modelling would be correct. However, typically firms face some com-
petition. Hence, in this subsection we consider a competitive situation with
m homogeneous organizations or firms. At stage 1, the firms simultane-
ously choose their market actions (given foundation). At stage 2, internal
rent seeking takes place. Let πf = α · π (xf ;x−f) be the profits of firm
f (f = 1, . . . ,m) with α > 0, xf denoting the decision of firm f and
x−f = (x1, . . . , xf−1, xf+1, . . . , xm) the decisions of the m − 1 other firms,8
and π being concave in xf . Furthermore, let e∗ = H (απ (xf ;x−f)) describe
the symmetric equilibrium effort of each individual in each firm at stage 2
with H (·) again being a monotonically increasing function as in Section 3.
Then, in stage 1, the utility of member i of firm f can be written as
uif =
απ (xf ;x−f)
n
− c (H (απ (xf ;x−f)))− κ
If each firm maximizes the utility uif of a representative member and an
interior solution exists, this solution can be characterized by the following
8For example, in case of Cournot competition, xf would be the quantity chosen by firm
f .
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first-order condition:
α
∂π
∂xf
·
µ
1
n
− c0 (H (απ (xf ;x−f)))H 0 (απ (xf ;x−f))
¶
= 0. (11)
Assume that — because of homogeneity — equation (11) has a symmetric solu-
tion x∗ (α), and that — as in Proposition 1 — c0 (H (·))H 0 (·) is monotonically
increasing. In this case, firm f would not implement maximum profits be-
ing characterized by ∂π
∂xf
= 0, but smaller profits so that the expression in
parentheses in (11) is zero, i.e.
1
n
= c0 (H (απ (ξ∗ (α))))H 0 (απ (ξ∗ (α))) (12)
with ξ∗ (α) := (x∗ (α) , . . . , x∗ (α)).
To test the "adverse selection" problem under competition, we now have
to check whether
uif =
απ (ξ∗ (α))
n
− c (H (απ (ξ∗ (α))))− κ (13)
increases or decreases in α. By applying the envelope theorem we obtain
duif
dα
=
∂uif
∂α
= π (ξ∗ (α))
µ
1
n
− c0 (H (απ (ξ∗ (α))))H 0 (απ (ξ∗ (α)))
¶
.
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Since the expression in parentheses is zero according to (12), we have
duif
dα
= 0.
In words, if in equilibrium the profitability parameter α increases, individual
utility will remain unchanged. Hence, if an organization is not founded in
the initial situation the individual players will not revise their decisions in
case of an exogenous increase of firm profitability. In particular, if foundation
is efficient because equilibrium profits exceed overall starting capital but the
organization is not founded due to anticipated excessive rent seeking, political
intervention which results into higher α cannot achieve efficiency.
Comparing the findings of this subsection with the result of Proposition 2
shows that the outcomes significantly differ although in both cases profits are
endogenous and profit enlargement is modelled via a marginal increase of the
scaling factor α. Moreover, in both cases an increase of α leads to downward
adjustment of the input variable µi or xf at the first stage, respectively, due
to anticipated rent seeking at the second stage. Hence, it seems puzzling why
organization members strictly benefit from increased profitability α in Propo-
sition 2 but in the competition case individual utility remains unchanged. An
explanation can be given by comparing the objective functions (2) and (13).
In the case of equation (2), organization members directly benefit from down-
ward adjustment of resource expenditures µi because individual input costs
are reduced. However, in the case of equation (13) there is no individual cost
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reduction. Here the organization f acts as a collective decision maker and
chooses its input variable xf solely in order to implement those profits which
maximize the concave objective function (13).
6 Conclusion
Generating non-negative profits is a necessary condition for the existence of
firms. However, the results of this paper have shown that this condition is not
a sufficient one since firm members do not want to maximize overall profits
but their individual utilities resulting from profit and rent seeking. As rent
seeking behavior strictly increases in firm’s profits it may be possible that
firms which would be efficient without rent seeking are not founded because
individuals anticipate excessive rent seeking at the next stage. Hence, from
an evolutionary perspective perhaps those organizations will survive which
are not the most profitable ones but which are most successful in solving
problems of internal rent seeking. The paper also shows that the theory
of rent-seeking contests offers an appropriate tool-box for analyzing internal
frictions such as politicking, haggling and influence activities which can be
summarized as internal rent seeking. If the organization members are able
to choose the degree of incompleteness of internal contracting there will be
a trade-off between contracting costs (e.g. for allocating internal property
rights) and the costs of rent seeking, and hence a possible starting point for
a formal approach to discuss transactions costs and the theory of the firm.
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